Temat: Paper 3: excerpt from M.A. Thesis: Multilateral Character...

General Information

The Gulf War of 1990 is the violent conflict between Iraq and a coalition of about 30 nations, although various sources deliver different number of the members. It is important to add that the coalition force was led by the United States and mandated by the United Nations. The clear purpose of the war was to liberate Kuwait. There are different names for the war and they include: Gulf War, Persian Gulf War, 1990 Gulf War, War in the Gulf, First Gulf War (to distinguish it from 2003 War in Iraq), Second Gulf War (to distinguish it from the Iran – Iraq War of 1980-1988), Mother of Battles, Liberation of Kuwait and War of Kuwait. The conflict in the Gulf was the first in the new world after the end of the Cold War. It was the first conflict during which the United States and the Soviet Union stood on the same side, which was pretty unique. Another thing that deserves to be called unique is the extreme involvement of such a large number of countries in the war. Not only was it due to the American international campaign in support of the war but also due to the strategic character of the area. Once again the United States stood in the position where they could use their overpowering advantage over other nations to force their will. I think that explaining the term multilateralism is crucial as far as the paper is concerned. According to the definition in The Dictionary of World Politics “[Multilateralism is] a policy of acting in concert with others to achieve objectives particularly with regard to diplomacy, defence and disarmament.” The core of understanding of the concept is that it is better to perform together with other nations for various reasons, like international support of such an operation as well as internal support. I think that as far as the international approval is concerned it is due to believe that a given participant is not involved in a conflict because of its sheer national interests but, supposedly, for the “right” cause like liberation, etc. Leading any military operation in the Persian Gulf region could easily be perceived as an assault upon its natural resources. Giving the conflict a multilateral character was an extremely smart move on the part of the U.S. This was the only way to build such a broad coalition and have even broader support for the involvement in the conflict.

Strategic Region of the Persian Gulf

The region of the Persian Gulf is a strategic area of the world for the United States of America. It is so for various reasons. One of them is oil, on which the U.S. is much dependent. The country has been interested in the area at least since the state of Israel was established there in the 1940s. Since that time, the region has been a place of constant fighting between non-Arab Israel, supported by the U.S., and its Arab neighbors. We can see that the position of the U.S. is quite a complex one as defending Israel, a violent enemy to the majority of nations there, it has to maintain good relations with the rest of the Arab states. Of course, national interests on both sides are the most important factor keeping the sides together. In the times of the Cold War, the Soviet Union competed with the United States for spheres of influence in the region. Such a situation did not allow any Arab states to even attempt the status of regional power. This situation, however, changed with the end of the Cold War. Edward Morse notes in Foreign Affairs that: “The new post-Cold War world is a place where would-be regional powers will be tempted to enlarge their bases of influence, thereby affecting the basic economic structures on which global well-being depends.” Such a situation, where there is leader in a strategic part of the world, cannot be accepted by the U.S., “the world’s most ravenous [oil] consuming country.”
The region is also important for the Iraqi themselves “because it is the principal route for Iraqi imports and oil exports and because of the vital financial and logistic support the Gulf Arabs have provided for Iraq’s war effort.”

The Causes of Iraq’s Invasion on Kuwait in 1990

In order to ‘cure’ the economy Saddam Hussein asked some Arab countries, members of OPEC, to “cut [oil] production and thus increase both oil prices and his [Saddam’s] income.” The countries, led by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, refused in unison. Edward L. Morse states that such a situation was to be expected:
In political terms, Saudi Arabia and other Arab producers want to avoid
price increase for which they could be blamed, as they were in the 1970s,
thus setting back their political relations with the United States. To achieve
their non-oil foreign policy objectives, they want to be seen as reliable
suppliers of oil at moderate prices.
Being “unable to compel OPEC to cut its production levels, thereby forcing oil prices higher and replenishing his treasury” Saddam began planning an attack. This was the first reason for the war. Saddam was convinced he had the right for his demands as he was the one to have saved Kuwait and other nations in the Persian Gulf from the spread of islamic fundamentalism from Iran. This could be a great justification for Hussein’s claim to leadership. He claimed that for “Iraqi blood spilled in the Arab defense” he was guaranteed the leadership status.
The second reason was a border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. The dispute had lasted since British officials drew bouderies between Iraq and Kuwait in 1922. The bounderies were, as Lafeber calls them, arbitrary. The problem with the land under dispute was that there were some oil fields and strategic islands there, and Hussein wanted to have them back. Such situation was predicted in 1988 CIA report on Iraq’s National Security Goals. The report says:
Despite the need to maintain harmonious relations [on the part of Iraq] with
Gulf Arabs, strategic considerations are likely to lead to severe tensions
with Kuwait over disputed territory if a peace settlement with Iran is signed.
Baghdad will probably try to gain control over Kuwait’s Bubiyan and
Warbah islands to increase its narrow access to the Gulf.
Apart from that, by possessing the islands, Iraq would be able to “move its oil terminals about 50 kilometers away from Iran.” This fact had to be taken into consideration by the Iraqi as Iran destroyed Iraq’s oil export terminals offshore at the very beginning of the war. Moving them further inland would lessen the danger of any future destruction. Kuwait did not accept Iraq’s demands as for the disputed territory. After being assured by the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, that the U.S. ‘had no opinion’ on the issue of the boundries, Hussein was certain that the States would not get engaged in the possible war. What is more, he believed that “Americans were [still] paralyzed by memories of Vietnam” , which would cause the American public opinion to be strongly opposed to any military action. The concept of the territory dispute was extremely crucial an issue for Hussein. He wanted to expand Iraqi territory to get more access to the Persian Gulf, a place vital for the export of Iraqi oil as well as for simple, unconstrained, goods exchange with the rest of the world. It is extremely important to add that Saddam Hussein was sure he could count on the Soviets, that they “would continue to support him.” Little did he know then that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was more pro American than ever. At least it turned out a little later that in this particular conflict the Soviets were to support the U.S. fully.
Hook and Spanier provide another reason for the invasion. It is “Saddam’s bid for hegemony” in the region. Right after the end of the Cold War “the absence of superpower rivalry [between the United States and the Soviet Union] left a power vacuum in the Middle East that one regional leader, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, attempted to fill.” Hussein planned it with good reason as then he would control OPEC and the rest of the Arab states, that were no match to Iraq. All the Arab neighbors were afraid of Iraqi might. Hussein immediately noticed an opportunity to get the aims he failed to achieve during the war with Iran, which are to “intimidate the Persian Gulf oil kingdoms and assert his dominance over the entire region.” For Bush administration such a situation was unacceptable as “no power could be permitted to dominate an area that contained resources so vital to the well-being of the international community.”
On August 2, 1990, Hussein seized Kuweit “in a lightning military operation.” In no time the capital of Kuwait was captured. With Kuwait’s oil reserves, he had under control about 20% of all oil reserves. There were fears by U.S. officials that attacking Saudi Arabia would be a great incentive for Iraq. Not only would Hussein then control 40% of oil reserves but also he would control “a close U.S. military ally” in the region. There were certain fears in the U.S. that Saudi Arabia would be Hussein’s next target, Saudi leaders were afraid as well. The invasion came as a shock to Washington as all the time they thought that Iraq’s threats toward Kuwait were just a bluff and the most Hussein could do was a part incursion.

International Response to the Invasion and Its Importance to the U.S.

The prospect of Iraq controling 40% of oil reserves, provided it attacked Saudi Arabia, which was more than possible, and “dictate the terms of OPEC production forced an aggressive response.” The answer was quick as “Japan and other Western powers froze Iraqi assets in their countries and those of the deposed government of Kuwait. This measure was accompanied by an embargo on Iraqi oil and other economic sanctions, to be enforced by a naval blockade of the Persian Gulf.” The quick reaction of the international community could be a sign for Bush and his administration that it was not only them who were interested in resolving the issue. Besides, it is important to add that the reaction was firm as the countries were sure the U.S. was on the same side. This situation put the U.S.A. in a position from which Americans could not back down. Had they done it, it would have made other states, some of them close U.S. allies like Israel or some Arab nations, distrust the United States. What is more, “it would endanger its [American] security, its economic growth as well as that of its major trading partners, and its status as the world’s lone superpower after the Cold War.”

The Involvement of the United Nations As an Indicator of Multilateralism

It is important to note that Bush “gained full support from the United Nations which, for the first time in its history, acted as its founders of 1944-1945 had planned. At the beginning American officials thought that the perspective of war with the United Nations coalition “would persuade Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait.” The UN gave Saddam a deadline as he was supposed to withdraw from the territory of Kuwait by January 15, 1991 otherwise “he would be ejected by force.”
There are five permanent members of the UN Security Council. They are: the U.S.A., Great Britain, France, China, and the Soviet Union. It should be noted that for the first time in the conflict, the Soviet Union with Gorbachev “cooperated with rather than blocked UN action.” Hook and Spanier notice a remarkable unanimity within the UNSC by saying that it “demonstrated how great-power politics had changed with the end of the Cold War.” In the past, the five permanent member of the Security Council “had agreed on virtually nothing and the two superpowers had vetoed any call for collective action.” Once the Soviet Union and China showed support for the defensive strategy and the sanctions, it was hard to predict, however, how the two UNSC members would react to a “more aggressive strategy.” Although Gorbachev was for a peaceful, negotiated, solution of the conflict, he failed. China abstained in the final Security Council voting to authorize the use of force. Hook and Spanier call the cooperation within the UNSC “[an] unprecedented solidarity .”
On November 29, 1990, the United Nations Security Council authorized the use of force after the deadline – January 15, 1991. As a result, the UN allowed to “’use all means necessary’ to achieve the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the territory of Kuwait.” It was believed that “only an overwhelming show of force and international solidarity would persuade Saddam to give up his gains.” The United Nations Security Council was so determined to settle the issue that it not only authorized the use of force but also imposed mandatory sanctions on Iraq. There was hope that the sanctions would make Hussein resign his claims. The involvement of the United Nations was, I think, one of the most important factor to give the conflict a multilateral character that guaranteed the successful creation of the broad international coalition. The UN engagement could even create a situation where it would be better for certain countries to join than to be not involved.

Building of the Coalition As an Indicator of Multilateralism

The ability to piece together nations into an anti-Iraq coalition is, as Lafeber calls it, “[one of] the most spectacular successes of Bush’s presidency.” The alliance included states that on every day basis were “violent political enemies.” Who would have thought that Israel was in the same coalition as Syria or Saudi Arabia. Bush wanted to have the possibly broadest support as “[h]e was convinced that the UN had made it clear that driving Iraq from Kuwait was an international position, not just an American one.” By giving the action a multilateral character, Bush could silence voices of disapproval in the United States and calm the Arab countries, “where Arab leaders were hypersensitive to Western interference in their affairs.”
It is important to notice that many countries, during the war of 1991, discovered that their national interests were parallel. Complementary interests, namely parallel, are the basics for making alliances with others. Some wanted to join the alliance because they desired to retain good relations with the United States, strategy for future cooperation. Some wanted to obtain contracts for rebuilding Iraq and Kuwait after the war. Some countries were simply afraid they would be the next target. Some awaited military or economic aid from the greatest superpower in the post-Cold War period. Anyway, it is always better to be on the same side as the U.S., and have it as your friend. Bush took advantage of that situation. The circumstances for a collective action were really at hand. It was clear for Bush that his administration’s decisions must be quick and firm. First of all, the coalition itself was unique. It means that it had never, or at least hardly ever, happened in the past. There were acutely various actors in it, very often opposing one another, and one inappropriate move could destroy the efforts to build the alliance. Any indicator of American unwillingness to use force could “cause the international coalition to disintegrate and that some coalition members, especially the Arab countries or the U.S.S.R., might seek a seperate peace.” Such a situation, where a seperate peace would be achieved, would be totally unacceptable for the U.S. as they would lose the influence in the region. George Bush had a very important task, he “had to maintain an unprecedented and fragile international coalition.”
Great Britain is considered the closest of all U.S. allies so consiquently they supported the United States from the very beginning of the crisis. British nation depended on Kuwaiti money , which made their commitment justified. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher even ‘pushed’ Bush to action. Britain’s deployment of forces in the 1991 conflict was the largest since 1945.
France, not surprisingly, turned out to be “a reluctant ally, attempting to carve out an independent role far beyond its significance, and often at the expense of collective good.” The country was an important trade partner for Iraq. Eventually, however, France joined in because of “the perceived need for strengthened ties with the U.S. to offset the impact of German unification [and it] led to limited cooperation.”
In January 1991, Constantinos Mitsotakis, Greek Prime Minister from 1990 to 1993, in his address to the Greek nation stated that “Greece participated in Gulf War I since international law had been broken by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.” For Greek authorities the involvement of the UN, meaning international legitimacy, was also taken into consideration while making the decision. Greece took part in the war to “contribute along with many other countries to the defence of international law and the national independence of Kuwait.” The fact that Turkey joined the alliance as well spoke for Greek involvement in the conflict. Turkey has always played an important role in Greek foreign policy. In order to keep good relations with Turkey, Greece decided to join. It was a strategic move as Greece followed its own national interests. Multilateralism and international law enforcement are the basic principles of Greek foreign policy. This is majorly the reason why in 2003 Greece refused to join the U.S. in fighting Iraq as then there was no international consensus and the U.S militarey action under George W. Bush was largely unilateral.
Turkey decided to join the anti-Iraq coalition because it “wanted to improve its international position concerning its relations with the EU [then EC – European Community] and the U.S. and managed to upgrade its strategic importance.” Turkey was an important partner in the coalition due to its strategic geographical location. President Turgut Özal made a politically calculated move committing Turkey “as a staging ground for U.S. and coalition air forces against Iraq.” This was a well calculated move because Özal hoped for “a substantial return on his country’s investment in the war effort, from both the United States and Europe.” In return for Turkish ivolvement, Özal wanted the U.S. to help the country in application for EC membership. Besides greater access to U.S. market for textiles from Turkey as well as a “revision of the seven-to-ten ratio in U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey.” There were also some dangers and risks connected with Turkey’s engagement. By helping the allied forces Özal could open his country up to a direct attack from Iraq. What is more, there was a strong opposition to the war within the nation. Some opposing parties were accusing Özal of ‘one-man rule.’ Turkish Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, called Turkey’s involvement in the war an “’act of submission’ to the United States.” As far as the costs are concerned, they were difficult to measure. First of all, trade with Iraq was stopped due to the war, not to mension revenues from Iraqi oil in Turkish pipelines that were blocked. Due to the war, oil prices increased as well. There could also be some strategic losses for Turkey, like deterioration of Turkish – Iraqi relations, a long trading partner. There were obvious benefits and costs of joining the alliance. For Özal, however, the benefits were larger and more forward thinking. Anyway, opposition party leaders accused Özal for “having given too much for too little.”
Canada joined the alliance, similarly to Denmark, Australia, Sweden or Norway, because of idealist reasons as it thought that the new coalition was a sign of the new world order where multilateralism and the U.N. would play a larger role in international crises. The second reason for Canada’s joining was the question of human rights abuses in Iraq, the possible development of weapons of mass destruction or of nuclear weapons and that “naked agression [against Kuwait] will not stand.” Canada, a long opponent of unilateral action by the United States , noticed that this conflict was to be of multilateral character and that was the major argument for intervention.
Israel and Saudi Arabia joined the coalition because of security concerns as they, long U.S. allies, although opposing each other, feared they could be the next target. It is important to note that there were certain fears in Washington that Saudis could back down. All Americans had to do was to “demonstrate their commitment to attacking Iraq.”
In case of Japan and South Korea the situation was similar. Both countries depended on U.S. stability forces in Asia. What is more, Japan would not be pleased with instability in the Persian Gulf regions as the country, lacking any valuable resources, depended on the Middle East oil.
At that time Germany, partitioned for a long time, was in a difficult situation as well. The country supported and joined the alliance as it “needed diplomatic support for reunification.”
Soviet Union was not only an American long opponent but also an Iraqi trading partner. The role of the Soviets in the conflict was crucial as for its multilateral character. The Soviet Union was the UN Security Council member and through it the UN authorization was possible. When Iraqi invasion started, Secretary of State James Baker and the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze produced a joint statement condemning the invasion. Shevardnadze “called for immediate cutoff of military equipment to Baghdad.” Gorbachev added that the Soviet Union was even partly responsible for the invasion due to military trade with Iraq. As far as Soviet participation in the alliance was concerned, there were some costs connected. First of all, the S.U. might not be able to retrieve a $6 billion of Soviet military debt , what is more, good Soviet – Iraqi relations would be damaged. In general, Soviet profit from selling weapons to Iraq in 1991 was three times smaller from the average of 1980s. There were also some concerns about the safety of Soviet workers working in Iraq as well as a strong split inside the nation. Sovetskaia Rossia stated that through participation in U.N. resolution 678, which authorized the use of force against Iraq, the Soviet Union let the U.S.A. take the leading position in the conflict as well as by taking part in the coalition, the U.S.S.R.’s status as a superpower ended. There were, however, certain benefits that tempted the Soviet Union into joining the coalition. First of all, in the post-Cold War era, the Soviet Union could not allow itself to be isolated. It had to act on international arena. To oppose the UN resolutions, thus,it would be against new Soviet interests as they “enjoyed broad international backing.” What is more, on September 6, President Bush promised “to provide international aid in return for Soviet cooperation in the gulf.” So, there were some economic interests except for mere principles. The third benefit would be improving relations with other Arab states, like Saudi Arabia. In September 1990, Saudi Arabia reestablished diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, frozen in 1938. The Saudis also “declared their interest in seeing Soviet troops participate in the multinational force.” The payoff came in December when Saudi Arabia and other Persian states granted the Soviet Union a loan of $3 billion.
Prof. Zbigniew Brzeziński states that Poland as a nation is in a position where, with the danger from the East, it has to look for strong support from the West, a support that would be strengthened by an alliance with the U.S. Brzeziński applies this statement to contemporary situation. I think, however, that it could be applied to the 1991 Gulf War coalition. In the light of what Brzeziński said, in 1990 and 1991 the danger from the East, namely the Soviet Union, was far more obvious than it is now. I think it was the major reason why Poland joined the coalition. As a new democracy, it had to take a stance on which side it was. After almost half of century being in the opposite camp, this was the best moment. The decision of Polish authorities was really strategic as it provided grounds for future American – Polish cooperation and good relations. This is best indicated in the fact that Poland represented American interests in Iraq after the conflict. I think that the same argument determined the stance of the Czek Republic or Romania in the conflict as the country was in the same situation. After the conflict radio stations in Prague broadcast American propaganda to Iraq.


States That Did Not Join the Coalition

There was no country in Europe that decided to stay out of the alliance. Those nations resolved to act that way as after probably a thorough estimation of losses and profits. There is an interesting thing to be noticed as far as geographical location is concerned. Jordan and Yemen were the ones, close Iraqi neighbors. The reason for them not participating can be understandable due to various agreements between them and Iraq. In opposition to this, the decision not to join in would be completely incomprehensible. There was no chance of any closer ties between them and Iraq and, what is more, they at all cost wanted to keep good relations with the U.S. at that difficult time for Europe. The difficult time being the new world after the Cold War which would indicate the later stance of the whole nation in the eyes of the Americans. European countries would have lost a lot more if they had decided to stay out.
As I mentioned above, Jordan was one of the countries that decided not to join the coalition. This reaction was unexpected by the United States as king of Jordan, Hussein, “was regarded as one of America’s closest allies.” After having a closer look it should not have been such a great surprise. First of all, Jordan was economically dependent on Iraq. Iraq is Jordan’s largest trade partner, the market for 23% of its exports. The standards of living of many Jordanians could be “sharply reduced.” This factor could lead to an eruption of a domestic strifle. The country lacks oil or any valuable natural resources that is why “trade and aid involving Gulf states are vital for Jordan’s economy.” What is more, in exchange for Jordan’s support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq was selling Jordan cheap oil. Besides, after invading Kuwait, “[Saddam] was an intimidating presence on his border.” King Hussein had one more thing to worry about after possible joining the allied forces. The attitude of Palestinians living in Jordan had to be taken into consideration as they were the majority in this country. The Palestinians fully supported Iraq in the conflict. Saddam Hussein was a fan probably not only among the Palestinians but also among the Jordanian people. Stanley Reed in Foreign Affairs writes: “Jordanians are being denied the sort of sound information needed to come to an intelligent consensus on an approach to the gulf crisis. Not only are the local newspapers slanted in Iraq’s favor, they rarely admit the possibility of an Iraqi defeat.” We can draw a conclusion that the Jordanian ‘street’ believed undisputable Iraqi victory. Possible support for Iraq could cause, if not a split, a disintegration of the country. King Hussein could be toppled as a consequence. What other reaction of the crowd could be anticipated if, by siding the U.S., king Hussein would be dragging the country, to their minds, into a certain disaster. The unsettled question of the Palestinians can “be the greatest threat to Jordan’s stability.” It is crucial to note that king Hussein did not believe that the international intervention would be so ‘welcomed’ by the Arab world. He probably never took into consideration that his country would be one of the few not to join in.
On November, 29 1990, Yemen was the only country that voted against Operation Desert Storm. Immediately after that the U.S.A. cancelled its help in the form of $70 million. As a result of its pro-Iraqi stance, 900,000 Yemenian workers were forced to return home from various Arab states, mostly from Saudi Arabia. This situation caused a major economic crisis leaving Yemen in a position of one of the poorest and most debted countries in the world, with unemployment rates reaching about 25%. Yemenian stance in the conflict was not forgotten in the Gulf and cooled Yemen’s relations with other Arab states.

Conclusion
All in all, on the front, the character of the conflict seems to be multilateral. The United States took a lot of effort in order to gain international support. There are voices, however, that the whole international support was just a cover-up to get internal support within the US. It is important to add that due to the vastness of the coalition, it was very difficult to maintain it. The members in the coaltion very often countries opposing each other on daily basis and out of the sudden they were put in a situation where cooperation among them was needed. The burden of maintaining the alliance was on the part of the United States. The country had to be very careful with every move. One of the thoeries even states that the fact that Hussein’s dictatorship was not toppled because of the Arab members of the coalition. Right after Kuwait was liberated, the U.S. moved out and considered the mission accomplished. Probably, if they had attempted to topple Saddam Hussein, other Arab states would have treated it as an attack or an invasion on an Arab country not just for the purpose of liberation. The act of toppling the regime could discourage the rest to act collectively. I think that the war in the Gulf is o truely multilateral character in total opposition to the second Gulf War of 2003. the reason explaining that is quite simple. After the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 caused President Bush to believe he would have the internal support of his nation as long as it takes. Americans were in a state of shock as it was the first direct attack on their country. Under such circumstances he did not, he believed, need international approval. It is worth mentioning that right after the terrorist attacks, the world claimed they would support any action necessary to compel terrorism. Their eagerness, however, vanished into thin air quite quickly. The situation was different in 1990 where Iraq attacked Kuwait. The Bush administration realized immediately that America’s national interests were at stake and in danger. First of all, the oil, and second of all, dominance in the strategic region could be taken over. The fact that much of the world is dependent on oil from that area made the attempts for a collective action a lot easier.
When, however, we look at Yemen, the non participant in the war, and how the U.S. punished the country cutting back financial help, we can call the multilateralism’forced.’ It is as if the slogan for it was: either you join us (plus the rest of the world) or you are against us.
Despite the fact I think that the war had clear multilateral character. It was obvious from the very beginning that it would be American-led. There were no attempts to create a front or facade that balance of power within the coalition would be evenly distributed among all the members. the number of American troops and the U.S. financial contribution were the greatest. Besides, it was the dominant world power so it was common knowledge that their role would be the leading one. The number of countries participating was large. Some nations sent their troops there, others, like Japan, contributed financially whereas the rest helped logistically. For me, it is clear that multilateralism occured in the Gulf War of 1990-1991.






Bibliography
Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay. Ameryka Bez Ograniczeń: Rewolucja
Busha w Polityce Zagranicznej. Warszawa: Von Borowiecky, 2005.

Evans, Graham, and Jeffrey Newham. The Dictionary Of World Politics: A Reference Guide
to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions. New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo,
Singapore: Simon & Schuster, 1990.

Foreign Affairs. ”The Road to War.” Vol. 70, Issue 1 (1990/1991): 1-4.

Fuller, Graham E. “Moscow and the Gulf War.” Foreign Affairs Summer
(1991): 55-76.

Hook, Steven W., and John Spanier. American Foreign Policy Since World
War II. 15th ed. Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2000.

Kissinger, Henry. Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy
for the 21st Century. New York London Toronto Sydney Singapore: Simon
& Shuster, 2002.

Kuniholm, Bruce R. “Turkey and the West.” Foreign Affairs Spring (1991):
34-48.

Lafeber, Walter. The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home
and Abroad, 1750 to the Present. 2nd ed. New York, London: W W Norton
& Company, 1994.

Laurent, Eric. Wojna w Iraku: Ukryte Motywy Konfliktu. Warszawa: Świat
Książki, 2003.

Leksykon Państw Świata. Warszawa: Real Press, 1993.

LeMoyne, James. ”Saudis Cultivate Ties to Kremlin in Hope of a Soviet
Muslim Role.” The New York Times, December 5, 1990.

Lieber, Robert J., ed. Eagle Rules? Foreign Policy and American Primacy in
the Twenty-First Century. Upper Saddle River New Jersey: Pearson
Education Inc., 2002.

Malendowski, Włodzimierz, ed. Zbrojne Konflikty i Spory Międzynarodowe u
Progu XXI Wieku: Analiza Problemów i Studia Przypadków. Wrocław: Atla
2, 2003.

Malendowski, Włodzimierz, and Czesław Mojsiewicz, eds. Stosunki
Międzynarodowe. Wrocław: Atla 2, 2000.

Malik, Ryszard. Saddam Husajn: Gangster z Tikritu. Kraków: Assimil Polska,
2004.

Miller, Judith, and Laurie Mylroie. Saddam Hussein. The Crisis in the Gulf.
New York: Time Books Random House, 1990.
Morse, Edward L. “The Coming Oil Revolution.” Foreign Affairs Winter
(1990/91): 36-56.

Reed, Stanley. “Jordan and the Gulf Crisis.” Foreign Affairs Winter (1990/91):
31-35.

Roskin, Michael G., Robert L. Cord, James A. Medeiros, and Walter S. Jones.
Wprowadzenie do Nauk Politycznych. Poznań: Zysk i S-ka, 2001.

Schulzinger, Robert D. U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900. 5th ed. New York Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002.

Steinberg, Gerald M. Review of Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Gulf
War, ed. by Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger. The
American Political Science Review vol. 92, no. 3 (September, 1998): 743-
744. (http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~steing/arms/aspr92.htm, accessed July 7, 2006)

Swofford, Anthony. Jarhead: Żołnierz Piechoty Morskiej. Katowice: Sonia
Draga, 2005.

Żakowski, Jacek. ”Raport: Cierpnie Skóra.” Polityka, August 2006, 4-12.



INTERNET SOURCES
Primery sources
CIA Report. “Iraq’s National Security Goals: an Intelligence Assessment.”
December 1988.
http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd02.pdf

Secondary sources
http://www.aish.com/jewishissues/middleeast/Arab-Israe... (11.12.2006)

Swaidan, Ziad, and Mihai Nica. “The 1991 Gulf War and Jordan’s Economy.”
Middle East Review of International Affairs vol. 6, no. 2 June (2002).
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue2/jv6n2a7.html

Tzogopoulos, George. ”Greece and Gulf War II.” MA. http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/p...

http://www.answers.com/topic/gulf-war (18.12.2006)

http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~steing/arms/aspr92.htm (23.12.2006)












author: Bartosz M. Kraszewski

American Studies Center, University of Warsaw